Statehood of hope

( pročitaj Identitetske politike na hrvatskome jeziku )

1 - What language do we speak?

Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Bosnians—what language do we really speak? We have never needed translators. But do we actually speak differently?

This story is both complex, but also very simple at the same time. Everywhere, languages are shaped by laws, both written and unwritten. In our countries, these laws were designed to preserve the social structures of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.

So why, then, do we need to have four languages instead of two? Why four different spirits?

Serbia once lay on the main path of the Ottoman advance into southern Hungary and further into Europe. Contrary to common belief, Croatia was not primarily on that route. Bosnia, being on the flanking path and with its rebellious history, endured the heaviest repression under the Ottomans. At the same time, Montenegro, protected by its mountains and considered unimportant as such, was largely spared. These unique experiences shaped the spirit of our languages.

This seemingly complex story has one simple point: a Serb and a Croat in Vojvodina, just as a Croat and a Serb in Dalmatia, have always spoken the same language and used the same script.

 

 

2 - Collective identities

Suppressed and unspoken collective identities too often serve as a means of provoking and justifying conflicts driven primarily by material interests. This approach demands a radical change today.

Modern identity politics are now forcing us to deal with climate and economic migration. Writing about collective identities is incomparable to writing history textbooks. It's more like writing a resume for a job application. You should start from the possibility that your conversation partner knows absolutely nothing about you, as well as the chance that they only know the worst about you. In such situations, your task is to explain in the simplest way possible that you are indeed worth communicating and collaborating with.

One important rule applies here: while embellishing the truth is allowed, lying is not.

Therefore, transparent and easily understandable identity politics should be a means of mutual understanding and respect, and above all, they should protect individuals from being manipulated into conflicts.

As a tourist country, Croatia has an additional incentive to ensure the recognizability and transparency of its identity politics.

3 - Statehood of hope

In some interpretations of the messages from Pope John Paul II, the Croatian people have come to be seen as a nation of hope. Such a thing of course, does not exist. But there are statehoods with different symbolic meanings. Croatian statehood, for instance, holds a special symbolic significance for the Catholic Church and Christianity as a whole.

The Republic of Croatia in the medieval period, which we refer to as the age of national rulers, lasted about 200 years, from 879 to 1089. This was a time of strong papal diplomacy, as well as a time of decentralization within Christianity, which did not split due to conflict, but rather in an effort to decentralize in order to strengthen the defense of its eastern borders. During this period, the Frankish Empire was supposed to protect the northeastern borders, while the Byzantine Empire safeguarded the southeastern borders of Christian lands.

In these relations, the links between Western and Eastern Christianity were maintained by Venetian trading ships on their route from Venice to Constantinople. On this route, the islands along the eastern Adriatic coast played a crucial role in protecting maritime routes from the restless open sea. Safeguarding the safe hinterland of this route, and thus ensuring connections between Christians, gave meaning to the existence of the early Croatian states.

This statehood symbolism still belongs to all the peoples in the unique area from the Adriatic Sea to the River Drava.

 

4 - Raison d'etre of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia in the era of national rulers

Croatian National Rulers (from 879 to 1089)
Serbian National Rulers (from 1168 to 1371)
Bosnian National Rulers (from 1180 to 1463)

Small nations surrounded by larger ones have always needed a clear reason for their existence to be respected. The creation of states for small nations like Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia is linked to a time of decentralization and later attempts to recentralize Christianity.

Today, Christianity remains trapped in divisions often inviewed  with mystical meanings. At its core however, it revolves around the eternal dilemma of the effectiveness of decentralized versus centralized defense of territory. The weakening of Byzantium led to the abandonment of the concept of decentralized defense for Christianity and attempts to re-establish centralization.

The takeover of Byzantine lands in the Balkans in the name of preserving Christianity began towards the end of the era of Croatian national rulers on behalf of Catholics, and continued during the time of Serbian and Bosnian national rulers. The difference between the Bosnian and Serbian noble estates at that time lies in their foundations. The medieval Serbian lands were established and developed with the direct encouragement of the Pope and the approval of the Patriarch of Constantinople, while the Bosnian lands emerged as a rejection of the personal union of Croatian and Hungarian nobility.

The reintegration of the rebellious Bosnian nobility into the Catholic international community, who had embraced Bogomilism in defiance, was entrusted after a series of unsuccessful attempts  to the still young Franciscan order. They arrived in Bosnia on a papal mission in 1291. Gradually, as they gain believers, the Franciscans unwittingly inherited the rebellious legacy of the Bosnian nobility. As a result, the followers of the Franciscans faced the most brutal repression under Ottoman rule. However, despite all that repression, the Bosnian Franciscans remain to this day, what we can confidently call, the soul of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5 – Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy is a symbol of unity, but at the same time, represents the disunity among Christians. It was threatened by Christians from both the northeast and northwest, yet at its core, it was an alliance of Catholic countries defending against Ottoman conquests that were then threatening the European continent from the southeast.

This community stemmed from the medieval Croatian statehood - statehood of Christian hope.

During the era of Croatian medieval rulers, there was no Austria or Hungary. There existed the Frankish and Byzantine empires, and the Venetian Republic, which maintained trade links between the two empires on the route from Venice to Constantinople. Medieval Croatia serves as a guardian of the hinterland of these maritime connections, and thus a link among Christians. For security reasons, this led to the alliance of Croats and Hungarians, initially intended to be under the Croatian crown, through the marriage of Croatian King Zvonimir and the Hungarian noblewoman Helena at 1063.

For centuries, the Austrian and Hungarian aristocracy downplayed and denied the Croatian roots of their power, not wanting any third party to interfere in their own comfortable rule. In the 19th century, the myth-making and grand ambitions of small and long-oppressed Serbia went unchecked because no one stood up in time to defend the Croatian identity. In fact, the Austrian and Hungarian aristocracy, out of their own interests and at Croatia’s expense, even encouraged this Greater Serbia ambition with a sneer - right up until 1914, when no one was laughing anymore.

However, despite the fact that today's Republic of Croatia has little reason to admire the former empire, it should be noted - as explicitly stated in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia - that the man assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914 was the last legitimate heir to the throne that had ruled Croatian lands for centuries.

 

6 - Croatia's bitter wound

The South Slavic community, which many in Croatia refer to as Croatia’s bitter wound, is an inseparable part of Croatian heritage. And it is after all, our wound and our only, Croatian wound, no matter how bitter it may be.

This wound does not begin with Bishop Strossmayer. It is part of Croatian heritage dating back to the time of the first medieval Croatian national rulers, when neither Serbia nor Bosnia, nor the precursors of any of today's republics existed. This heritage was then adopted and continued by the Bosnian national rulers until their downfall in 1463.

Bishop Strossmayer in the 19th century did not create this heritage; rather, he renewed it, importantly noting that it was an integral part of the Austro-Hungarian community of nations. Strossmayer’s vision of the South Slavic community was later realized by Josip Broz Tito, who chose Jajce as the founding place of his community, symbolically continuing the legacy of the Bosnian national rulers.

It is worth mentioning that, unlike the Bosnian king Tvrtko, who in 1377, only six years after the Battle of Marica and the real fall of medieval Serbia, merely claimed to be the ruler of the Serbs, Croat Tito actually was that.

7 – NDH

My mother always told me that my grandfather, who was a well-positioned Ustaša official from the first day until the last, referred to the communists as “our boys.” My mother, who worked in education during the era of one-party rule, always spoke well of fathers, so my thoughts on this were always the same: “Yeah, alright Mum.”

Of course, “our boys” took everything away from my grandfather, and he wasn’t without possessions. After he somehow returned from Dravograd, fortunately, he didn’t make it to Bleiburg; our boys sent him off to a long prison sentence. They threw my grandmother, along with her four children - one of whom was not even a year old - out onto the street without a second thought. For several years, she had no idea what had happened to my grandfather or even if he was alive.

Today, that’s just tempi passati.

However, when the wars of the 1990s began, and with the demonization of the so called Independent State of Croatia (NDH) as the main driving force behind those wars, I started seeking answers about what the NDH actually was. I was particularly motivated by the propaganda surrounding camps that allegedly aimed to exterminate Serbian children. Yet, from my grandfather, an Ustaša, through his daughter, my mother, I learned that it was quite the opposite - it was about trying to save children in a makeshift state that couldn’t even explain to its youth, who were "For Home Ready," why they were fighting on the Eastern Front at all.

But what intrigued me most in this whole story was the question of how I could live surrounded by so much heroism? How could it be that none of the European nations with a long tradition of warfare managed to resist the Nazis, yet we - uniquely - did?

Let’s be clear: yes, the National Liberation War (NOB) was an epic struggle; there’s no doubt about that. But how and why was it only in the territory of the NDH? Why was there no significant resistance in either Serbia or Slovenia? Although we are the same heroic nations. Why, in all its tragedy, is even the joke of resistance in Istria not worth mentioning or comparing to what Tito’s partisans achieved across Mountain Učka?

The answer lies in the fact that the success of the partisan movement requires more than just the support of the people. It also needs the backing and sympathy of part of the government. The greater and more widespread that sympathy is, the greater the success of the partisan resistance. Hence, there is a story that is missing - the story of “our boys” with which I opened this topic.

But the reason for bringing up this topic is a very explicit thought that raises no doubts in me, that there cannot be, and there will never be, normal coexistence between Serbs and Croats without reconciliation between the Ustaša and the Partisans! In an environment of mutual demonization of Ustaša and Partisans, it is primarily, and almost exclusively, the Serbian people who suffer.

8 – The Interest-Driven Causes of the Wars of the 1990s in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Wars have always been driven by specific material interests. It’s neither a secret nor a revelation to state that the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army), which was also our Croatian army until the death of Josip Broz Tito, was the primary instigator of the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, driven by its own material interests.

Aside from the JNA’s material interests as the main driving force behind the wars of the 1990s, another commonly mentioned factor is the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC).

It’s often said that the SPC preserved Serbian identity through the difficult times of Ottoman rule. However, the facts reveal a very different story. During the Ottoman Empire, the SPC, as a privileged non-Islamic religious institution, greatly increased its landholdings and the number of its followers, acting more as a partner than as a vassal of Ottoman rulers. The Ottoman Empire wasn’t an empire of scorched earth; its expansion would never have been possible without the SPC. So, did the SPC in Ottoman times care more for the Serbian people or more for expanding its own estates? And has the situation changed at all today? Looking at the wars of the 1990s, we might say, not at all.

A third factor often cited as a cause for the wars of the 1990s is the now almost mythical tale of Tuđman’s ‘200 families.’ This isn’t about the elite of some future state but rather the elite of the former state. It’s a story that reveals the secret of Milošević’s unhidden affinity for Tuđman. It was a peace-seeking story intended to prevent war.

How history will one day rank these three factors remains to be seen.

 

9 - Croatian-Bosniak conflict

The so-called Croatian–Bosniak conflict of 1993 does not exist. From the perspective of the Republic of Croatia, what is often referred to as such can only be called the third offensive on Dubrovnik, aimed at isolating the city.

The wars of the 1990s in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were a unique endeavor by individuals under the control of the counterintelligence services of the Republic of Serbia, driven by the goal of conquering Dalmatia. Initially, this objective encompassed all of Dalmatia. However, after the actions of the Croatian Army in the Zadar hinterland, it was limited to the Dubrovnik coast.

Everything else not explicitly mentioned here—all the suffering endured by the South Slavic peoples that is not described here—is partly linked to what we now call hybrid warfare, previously known as counterintelligence operations.

End of story. (A story about the most trivial goals ever pursued in wars fought in these regions.)

The end of this story is needed, above all, by our dead—on all sides in the wars of the 90s.

The story of the search for the missing is not a search for the truth but exclusively for human dignity. The unfinished stories of all our wars of the 20th century remain the greatest obstacle to achieving this.

 

10 - Banovina Croatia

Pre-war Banovina Croatia was not a symbol of the breakup of the first Yugoslavia but rather the opposite—it was a symbol of efforts to preserve it. The agreement between Croatian and Serbian elites was signed in 1939, just two days after Hitler and Stalin divided Poland. Banovina Croatia represented an elite pact designed to prevent Yugoslavia from experiencing a similar fate.

Can something that symbolizes the preservation of Yugoslavia really be linked to Croatia’s wartime president, Franjo Tuđman?

For Tuđman, who came from military ranks, a clearly defined spatial command structure was essential for wartime leadership. The narratives surrounding the 1939 Banovina Croatia borders should be seen primarily in this light. The area of Banovina Croatia served as a military region, opposing the military regions of what was once our joint Yugoslav army during the Homeland War. These military regions were modified after the death of Josip Broz Tito by the Yugoslav military leadership under then-Chief of the General Staff, Branko Mamula.

Today, Banovina Croatia is rightfully enshrined in the Croatian Constitution—not as a symbol of preserving Yugoslavia, but as a foundation upon which the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were defended. There is no other reason for its inclusion.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, like the Republic of Croatia, were not defended on the Drina River but on Mountain Dinara and in the Neretva Valley, where the entire Greater Serbian campaign to consolidate its territory lost all meaning. From all key battles, both defensive and offensive, during the Homeland War, it is evident that the wars of the 1990s were primarily about territory and the Greater Serbian conquest of the Adriatic. This campaign had a main objective - Karlobag - and a fallback plan reaching the Neretva Valley.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the unfortunate and needless conflict between Croats and Bosniaks occurred shortly after the Maslenica operation, which shifted the course of the war and forced Greater Serbian ambitions to settle at least for the Neretva Valley and the eternally coveted Dubrovnik.

11 – Dubrovnik

The primary minimal goal of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was undoubtedly the conquest of Dubrovnik and its coast. However, this is not a story of recent origins. It is a tale of attempts to conquer it by eastern neighbors, which, with longer or shorter interruptions, lasted throughout the Middle Ages. The explicit Catholicism present in all records of the medieval Republic of Dubrovnik tells us primarily about the need for it to be explicitly documented.

Today's appropriation of Dubrovnik's literature by the Republic of Serbia indicates that this unfinished dream of conquering Dubrovnik continues to inspire the imagination of those who promote the well-known "Serbs all and everywhere" topics. This might not be so negative if it remains at an academic level, as the story of the Republic of Dubrovnik, when examined more deeply, contains the narrative of the origins of medieval Serbia.

Medieval Serbia did not emerge as a result of conflicts between Eastern and Western Christian leaders. On the contrary, Serbia was founded simultaneously with the encouragement of the Pope and the approval of the Patriarch of Constantinople, whose secular interests in the southern Balkans largely aligned, despite their disagreements. Medieval Serbia was created out of the need to preserve what could be maintained in the name of Christianity in the southern Balkans. Why would proud Greeks, despite hostilities, agree to be part of Dušan’s empire? The purpose of the establishment and existence of medieval Serbia was the need to gather Christians from what are now the regions of central Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Greece, Albania, and Macedonia. It is important to highlight that this was done with the mutual blessing of the Pope and the Patriarch of Constantinople. The medieval Serbian states of Dušan's Empire, just like the then Serbian Orthodox Church, were envisioned as continuators of the statehood of Christian hope, which characterized the early Croatian states during the time of decentralization of Christianity. While the early Croatian states acted as guardians of the connections among Christians, the medieval Serbian states were meant to play the role of reuniting threatened Christians.

The explicit and exclusive Catholicism of the Republic of Dubrovnik reveals the essence of the unspoken agreements between the Eastern and Western Christian leaders that influenced the formation of Saint Sava and the first Serbian states. These agreements enabled medieval Serbia to take over certain Byzantine territories, up to Dubrovnik, but never, ever beyond that city.

12 - Tito's adherents

In Croatia, there is a joke that today Croatia is governed by the adherents of Mate Granić, while Serbia is governed by the adherents of Vojislav Šešelj, and that Croatia is now a member of the EU only because it fared better in this division.

But what about us, the former adherents of Tito, and what does that even represent? Being a Tito’s adherent meant, above all, belonging to a community of peoples who protect one another. In other words, a community of peoples who do not attack, conquer, or subjugate one another.

Thus, when someone today asks us, the Tito’s adherents, what we think about the bombing of Belgrade, the only answer is – not enough and not on time.

It should be noted that the reason we can today freely speak about what it means to be a Tito’s adherent is thanks only to the Croatian soldier on the Neretva and Dinara, the Croatian soldier with Banja Luka in the sights, and especially the Croatian soldier in Maslenica and Vukovar.

Without their contribution, the outcomes of the wars of the 90s would be completely different today, and the remains of Josip Broz Tito would have long been thrown into the Danube and allowed to sink into oblivion.

13 - Bleiburg and Goli otok

Bleiburg and Goli Otok are two symbols of post-war suffering and represent two inseparable concepts. In this context, Goli Otok serves as a symbol of the attempt to end the cycle of violence that began in 1914 in Sarajevo.

For those of us who are a bit older, we remember the visit of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to Belgrade. Acting from a position of great power, he gave the green light for war in our former country. From the same position of great power, we were pushed into a joint state in 1918. In 1944, Britain and the Soviet Union did the same with the national liberation movement in what is now Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, also bringing Serbia into this community, despite its lack of significant involvement in that movement.

The mass post-war crimes symbolised by Bleiburg were not merely acts of revenge; they were carefully planned and executed as such. The main perpetrators were primarily Slovene and Serbian communists - not because of their nationality or because they were communists, but because they had not experienced the war, ZAVNOH, or ZAVNOBiH. They saw their chance for an ideological takeover of the national liberation movement under the guise of Yugoslav unitarism, aiming to climb the post-war social ladder. In this post-war ideological takeover of the national liberation movement, many Croatian and Bosnian communists also saw their opportunity.

These crimes continued in ways not seen elsewhere in the world, where anyone could kill and rob everyone under the cover of Yugoslav unitarism.

This situation persisted until the so-called Informburo Resolution in 1948. The conflict with the Soviet Union and Stalin was merely a facade for homogenising the people in the fight against the so-called internal enemy. Many innocent people suffered as a result. However, the mass violence committed by the Yugoslav unitarians came to an end.

Out of great respect for our Minister of Health during the war, it’s important to acknowledge the tragedy of his family and his father, Andrija Hebrang. This tragedy was meant to hide the greatest deception of the post-war Titoist community and its relationship with Stalin. The crackdown on explicit Croatian identity, with Andrija Hebrang as its most prominent symbol, was meant to mislead the Yugoslav unitarians intra-structure, which grew increasingly powerful by exploiting post-war crimes.

After the Informburo Resolution, only the violence of the state’s repressive apparatus remained, and we must definitely talk about its brutality. However, this does not fall under the category of post-war mass crimes. The homogenisation of the population facilitated by the Informburo Resolution, allowed the state repressive apparatus to avoid continuing the post-war crimes to the extent, that it threatened to.

Still, it's important to discuss the excessive use of force in defending the former state. At the same time, we need to acknowledge that the first Republic of Croatia, of which today’s Croatia is the successor, was part of that state, so the use of excessive force also played a role in preserving that first Republic, however imperfect she has been.

14 – Jasenovac

The Memorial Area of Jasenovac today is burdened by the post-war intention to shape the past in such a way that Jasenovac would unify all innocent victims of crimes that occurred throughout the NDH (Independent State of Croatia).

Two important points must be highlighted.

First - mass killings occurred in Jasenovac, although some may dispute this. However, these were not systematic murders like those in Nazi camps, where people were coldly exterminated. Unlike those camps, people could come to Jasenovac, and in many cases, they could leave. This was not the case with the Nazi camps, which were, as a rule, the last stop for their prisoners.

Second - the fundamental question regarding all Ustaša crimes is not the numbers of those killed, but rather the monstrous nature of these murders. We must ask whether the nature of these killings reflects a centuries-old hatred between Croats and Serbs, or if it suggests something entirely different: an attempt to forcibly instil hatred that had never existed before. Many war theorists argue that such hatred is necessary during wartime.

When questions are framed correctly, it becomes much easier to draw accurate conclusions.

15 – Totalitarian regimes

When we condemn totalitarian regimes, we must consider that two totalitarian regimes helped create the Republic of Croatia, which was then defended during the Homeland War.

Many today attempt to argue that the Republic of Croatia was either created or resurrected during the Homeland War. However, this viewpoint aligns with the same paradigm that asserted in 1918 and later in 1945 that a new history began then, while all the negative events that preceded those years should be forgotten.

The totalitarian regimes that formed today’s Republic of Croatia are uniquely our own and differ significantly from other European totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. Both of our totalitarian regimes were born in 1928 after the assassination of Croatian representatives in the Belgrade Assembly. Until then, Josip Broz Tito was merely a talented union activist. Even if he was a member of the banned Communist Party at that time, he was only so as a union representative and sympathiser, which was quite common then. The Ustaša movement, born in 1928, also did not stand out in any extreme way within the usual political life at that time.

During the National Liberation War (NOB) that led to the creation of the first Republic of Croatia, both of our totalitarian regimes, much like the story of the good cop and the bad cop, influenced the formation of the Republic of Croatia. It is important to understand that the partisan movement during World War II would not have been possible without the Ustaša state. In fact, it largely did not exist outside the territory of the so-called NDH (Independent State of Croatia).

This factual state of affairs is recorded in the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, which clearly states that the decisions of ZAVNOH (National Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Croatia) established the foundations of the state sovereignty of today’s Republic of Croatia. It also explicitly states that these foundations were expressed in opposition to the declaration of the Ustaša state. Thus, there can be no ZAVNOH, and certainly no ZAVNOBiH (National Anti-Fascist Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina), without the declaration of the NDH.

The self-proclaimed guardians against totalitarianism and moral watchdogs should first and foremost ask themselves if there is any state in the world that wasn't created through struggle, and that hasn't caused great pain and suffering of many, who in one way or another, were involved in its creation.

From a slightly lighter and more humorous perspective, we are witnessing a true flood of right-wing figures emerging from the elites of our former state. If the hallmark of totalitarianism is that all political options during totalitarian rule were pushed into the same pot, then where have the Ustaša leftists gone? If we already have an abundance of communist right-wingers, then where are our Ustaša leftists today?

16 – Bosnia and Herzegovina today

The problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina today is not the ethnic entities, but rather the ethnically cleansed entities.

The entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are nationally defined do not necessarily represent a division; rather, they can serve as a foundation for preventing external influences on the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign republic.

The right to national identity is now one of the fundamental rights of every individual. In multi-ethnic Europe, countries have agreed to protect such rights through bilateral agreements, mostly based on reciprocity. Would it be better for Croats in Banja Luka or Sarajevo to be cared for from Mostar, or would it be better to do that from Zagreb? The same applies to the relationship between Serbs and Belgrade. Do Bosniaks need Ankara, Tehran, or who knows what else, which is undoubtedly already taking place?

Are there mechanisms in place today in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is there even a desire, to allow all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take care of their national identity in all entities (which already exist in reality) across the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina? And can this be achieved precisely through nationally defined entities within the sovereign Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Revising the existing narratives about Herzeg-Bosnia is an important step along this path, as it illuminates the very origins of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s existence as a protector of Dalmatia, never-ever as a threat to it.

17 - Heart or Appendix

“Heart or appendix” - that is the question. This has been the eternal question for the Serbian people from the Adriatic to the Drava River.

We remember 1990 well, when the residents of King Zvonimir’s city, instead of being the heart of the Republic of Croatia — as they themselves chose in Topusko in 1944 — decided to be Serbia’s appendix. And, as each person is master of their own body, what is done when the appendix causes pain is clear and inevitable: it’s removed. Removed by its master. The master of the body would never harm his own heart.

Being the heart or the appendix of the territory from the Adriatic to the Drava was also a choice the Serbian people faced with the establishment of Banovina Croatia in 1939. The relatively mild and unexplored choices made by the Serbian people back then took a tragic turn two years later, with consequences that are still felt today.

“Heart or appendix” is a fundamental question that remains open for the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and no one can answer this question on their behalf but them.

Written by: Petar Bačić,  Pula 16. october 2024.